Government guarantees are often priced by appealing to an analogy with option pricing techniques pioneered by Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973) . Of course, in reality, the government does not purchase options in the open market. Instead, barring a Ponzi game opportunity, the government must adjust tax revenue or spending in response to shocks in the value of the asset being insured for the government to maintain its intertemporal budget constraint. Nonetheless, this article derives an exact mathematical relationship between fiscal policy and option pricing. Explicitly deriving the option pricing equivalence from first principles proves that the analogy is, in fact, correct and suitable for use by public finance economists and government officials to estimate the cost of government guarantees. Starting from first principles also has the benefit of showing that an additional mathematical term, which multiplies the option price, is necessary to capture the pay-as-you-go nature of most perpetual government guaranteesa term that is missing in the previous work.
have concluded likewise. The results herein show just the opposite. By focusing on expected returns, trust fund investment creates an instant windfall for current workers and is mathematically equivalent to a tax increase on all future workers, relative to a baseline policy of maintaining the current payroll tax rate. National saving is reduced. The author computes President Clinton's proposal to invest in equities to be equivalent to increasing the future payroll tax by 0.8 percent in perpetuity. A policy recommendation to invest about 40 percent of the trust fund in stocks analyzed recently by the Social Security Administration is equivalent to a 2.1 percent increase in the future payroll tax.
INTRODUCTION
As Robert Merton noted in his Nobel address, the use of option pricing technology has extended well beyond financial operations and has been used in numerous valuation problems, including government guarantees. The list is extensive and includes deposit insurance, student loan guarantees, loans to business, the government right to change quotas, and many other guarantees.
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Of course, in reality, the government does not purchase options for the purpose of hedging. Instead, barring a Ponzi game opportunity, the government must adjust tax revenue or spending in response to shocks in the value of the asset being insured for the government to maintain its intertemporal budget constraint. Government policy then becomes state contingent and the government's intertemporal budget constraint must be taken explicitly into account.
Although most analyses of guarantees rationalize using options pricing based on an analogy, this article starts with fiscal policy instruments and proves that the analogy is, in fact, true-with a modification. The author derives an exact mathematical equivalence between state-contingent fiscal policies and option pricing. Deriving implicit option prices from the government's intertemporal budget constraint not only brings an even greater sense of "reality" to the case for using arbitrage pricing technology to value government guarantees, but it is also important because many government guarantees are not prefunded. The option pricing formulae must be augmented with a multiplicative term that recognizes the pay-as-you-go nature of most perpetual guarantees.
As a relevant example, this article considers the proposal to alter the Social Security trust fund's portfolio from exclusively holding government debt to holding equity as well. The almost 6 percent historic equity premium creates a tempting opportunity to rescue the soon-to-be insolvent Social Security system by investing the Social Security trust fund in equities. The political nicety of this approach is that it would help avoid a benefit reduction without necessarily explicitly increasing the payroll tax. This type of plan has been discussed for years, but it has received new attention with the release of the report by the 1994-1996 Social Security Advisory Council (SSAC) and the recent endorsement by President Clinton to invest $768 billion in stocks by 2014. 2 Similar plans have been advocated recently by Robert Ball (1998) and Henry Aaron and Robert Reischauer (1998) .
1 Bodie (1999) considers the use of financial instruments in the context of Social Security reform. Bodie (1995) also demonstrates the importance of risk over long horizons. Analysts have extensively studied the effect that trust-fund investment in stocks would have on the financial solvency of the Social Security system as well as on the government's unified budget surplus. The Social Security Administration (SSA) analyzed a proposal for the 1994-1996 SSAC, another proposal from the Social Security Advisory Board (1998), and most recently President Clinton's plan (Goss, 1999) . Other government agencies analyzing similar plans include the General Accounting Office (1998) , the Office and Management of Budget (OMB, 1999) , and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO, 1999) . Each agency reported that investing a portion of the trust fund in equities would reduce the solvency problem facing Social Security and/or the unified budget deficit, because the return to equities is set equal to its historical average-typically 7 percent in real terms. Of course, the prospective expected rate of return on equities is difficult to estimate accurately (Merton, 1980) , and some observers argue that the current stock market is significantly overvalued (Campbell and Shiller, 1998) .
The forces by the SSA, OMB, and CBO on expected returns places added risk on future generations. By incorporating the expected value of trust fund asset income into budget projections, policymakers can spend more today, or have lower tax rates today, to satisfy Social Security's 75-year solvency horizon and/or satisfy a long-run unified budget deficit target. This would then force future policymakers to reduce spending or increase taxes if trust fund assets fall below their expected value. Future generations will only receive a windfall, ex post, by being able to spend more or cut taxes, if assets outperform expectation. It is interesting, therefore, to understand the ramifications of trust-fund investment in equities inside of this setting. Indeed, advocates of trust-fund investment in equities, including six members of the SSAC, consider contingency scenarios-in the form of changing payroll taxes or benefits-only if asset returns underperform their expected values.
Before proceeding, the author notes that the practice of attempting to create value from the asset management side of insurance, instead of the liability side, is common among private pension fund actuaries as well. 3 The key difference for Social Security, however, is that the federal government can use its taxing authority to shift risk to future generations, whereas in the case of private pensions, the living generally bear the risk. 4 Indeed, by focusing on expected returns, the government could expose future taxpayers to considerable risk by investing in high-beta assets.
Investing a portion of the Social Security trust fund in equities is a particularly interesting policy proposal because, unlike many government guarantees that are typically one-sided bets, the risks associated with trust fund investment can be distributed in several ways. Most advocacy groups do not actually specify how the risks will be allotted. Since Social Security pays for benefits using an earmarked pay-asyou-go payroll tax, either benefits or payroll taxes must respond to a shock in equity 3 See, for example, Babbel and Merrill (1999) and Gold (2000) . 4 The government-backed Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation adds even more risk to future generations. For federal deposit insurance and many state guarantees of insurance company solvency, guarantee premiums paid by insured member institutions depend, at least partially, on prior losses to the insurance trust fund, creating additional risk.
values. This article considers the following three basic possibilities, which are also summarized in Table 1: (i) Benefits are adjusted if trust fund assets deviate from their expected value.
(ii) Payroll taxes are increased if trust fund assets fall below their expected value; benefits are increased if trust fund assets exceed their expected value.
(iii) Payroll taxes are adjusted if trust fund assets deviate from their expected value. Notes: e = realized equity rate of return E(e) = expected equity rate of return The first choice, (i), is how returns would be distributed in a defined-contribution plan such as a 401(k) account. Social Security, however, is a defined-benefit system with benefit levels determined by law, not by the returns to the trust fund. Many, if not most, of those advocating trust-fund investment have made it clear that they want benefits to remain this way:
We reiterate that except for this change in investment policy, Social Security's principles and structure would remain unchanged under this approach. Social Security continues as a defined-benefit plan, with the amount of benefits and the conditions under which they are paid still determined by law . . . there would be ups and downs in returns but only very long-range trends would matter. And the assumed rate of return, while important, would be secondary to the fact that benefits would remain defined by law . . .
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The second and third choices, (ii) and (iii), are perhaps more consistent with these desires. Choice (iii) reflects a strict defined-benefit approach. The following sections analyze risk allocations (i), (ii), and (iii) in order. The following section proves that risk allocation (i) is neutral if no market rigidities exist. This is because of a standard Modigliani-Miller argument: risk allocation (i) creates a swap between private and public pensions with no change in aggregate saving and no price effects. The next section proves that the one-sided bet tax policy (ii) is mathematically equivalent to an intergenerational transfer of put options on a pay-asyou-go basis. The pay-as-you-go nature of this transfer generates a mathematical term that multiplies the value of the put option. Then, the subsequent section proves that risk allocation (iii) is equivalent to an intergenerational transfer of put and call options (a forward contract) on a pay-as-you-go basis. This two-sided bet tax policy can be priced either by using option pricing technology or directly from the equity premium.
ADJUSTING BENEFITS IN RESPONSE TO SHOCKS: THE NEUTRAL CASE
Suppose Social Security invests some of the trust fund in equities and that benefits are adjusted to reflect stock returns. This section shows that this policy can be a pure "shell game" that improves Social Security's finances but decreases private returns with no net effect on a person's combined private-public portfolio and no effect on any aggregate variable. This risk allocation most closely corresponds to Alan Greenspan's (1996 Greenspan's ( , 1999 ) recent criticisms of trust fund investment.
Assume that no market rigidities exist, such as trading costs, capital gains taxes, borrowing restrictions, or short-sale constraints. Agents are rational and fully informed, the trust fund is perpetual, and no intragenerational redistribution exists. Relaxing these assumptions may result in nonneutrality; but whether individuals are actually better off or worse off after trust-fund investment depends on which assumptions are relaxed.
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Under these assumptions, agents see through the veil of government, responding to changes in the public portfolio by offsetting private changes.
Formally, consider a simple two-period overlapping-generations economy. Although only the budget constraint is material for this section, the author uses the rest of the model in the subsequent sections. Consumers live for two periods, working for the first period and retiring in the second. The author assumes a consumer born at time t has the following preferences over a sequence of consumption, { }
where U( . ) is the felicity function that is assumed to be continuous, continuously differentiable, and strictly increasing along with U(0) = 0. The term
The author considers how relaxing each of these assumptions would affect the results in an earlier draft of this article, which is available from him.
where r is the rate of time preference. The assumption of time separability is immaterial for the key results herein.
The consumer makes labor income equal to Y 1,t at age 1 known at time t, consumes C 1,t and accumulates A 2,t assets for the second period of life. The agent can invest in equities that pay a risky rate of return equal to e t during period t, and the agent can invest in bonds that pay a constant, riskless rate of return equal to r known at time t.
The individual also faces a Social Security payroll tax equal to t , the proceeds of which are invested into three types of assets: bonds, equity, and a wage-indexed payas-you-go Social Security asset that pays a rate of return equal to g known at time t.
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It is assumed that r > g since, otherwise, a Ponzi game is possible and it would be Pareto improving to eliminate the trust fund altogether and return to strict pay-asyou-go financing. The consumer, therefore, faces the following budget constraint: 
where ( )
is the share of private assets invested into bonds, and ( ) 1-a is the share of assets invested in equities consistent the following first-order conditions:
where Under the risk allocation considered in this section, an agent receives whatever the equity-based trust fund pays out, whether large or small, in the form of benefits. Period 2 assets equal ( The assumption that g is known at time t is relaxed in Smetters (1998) where the author explores a privatization plan that reduces pay-as-you-go benefits and unfunded liabilities. The current article focuses only on shifting the trust fund's portfolio, and it is shown to be either neutral or to lead to an increase in unfunded liabilities. Allowing for g to be stochastic and correlated with e, though, would not change any of the key results in this article, but it would require additional cumbersome notation.
Notice from Equation (5) that the individual already effectively controls exactly how his or her payroll tax, 1 Y t , is divided between equity and debt. Specifically, the agent chooses a to obtain his or her optimal values of ( ) ( ) and 1 re baba −+−, the shares es of Social Security invested into risk-free debt and equity, respectively. Hence, any change in the investment strategy of Social Security that keeps the pay-as-you-go portion constant-e.g., investing the trust fund in equities ( ) -re bb ∆=∆ -has no effect on the combined public-private portfolio allocation of this agent. Intuitively, agents see the trust fund as their conduit for investing in bonds or equity and they take this into account in their private investment decisions. The following proposition is proved in the Appendix: Proposition 1 counters an incorrect yet widely held belief by those who adhere to the "shell game" scenario: namely, that an investment in equities by the trust fund will have detrimental price effects. For example, the 1997 Economic Report of the President (ERP) writes Another criticism of allowing the trust funds to invest in equities is that such investments would primarily represent a reallocation of assets between those held in the trust funds and those held-either directly or indirectly-by households. It could improve the financial position of the trust funds, because of equities' historically higher average returns, but for a given level of saving it would not increase the returns for the Nation as a whole. Investing a portion of the trust funds in equities would raise the price and lower the return on equities, and lower the price and raise the return on Treasury securities. Higher Treasury yields would raise Federal interest costs and, all else equal, the non-Social Security portion of the deficit.
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As Proposition 1 proves, investing the trust fund in equities is a pure swap between privately and publicly held assets with no need for prices to adjust. In any case, the real issue from a societal perspective is not price effects but how to allocate the trust fund's investment risk.
ADJUSTING TAXES IN RESPONSE TO SHORTFALLS: THE ONE-SIDED BET
Under the risk allocation considered in this section, any shortfall in the equity portion of the trust fund below expectation accrues to taxpayers in the form of higher taxes, while any return at, or in excess of, expectation is spent on higher benefits. This section shows that this state-contingent tax policy is equivalent to an intergenerational transfer of put options on a pay-as-you-go basis.
To derive these results formally, let e denote the time-t rate of return to equity expected immediately before time ( ) = :| tt teEet . By assumption, the payroll tax is 8 The 1997 Economic Report of the President, p. 113. raised on workers to fully absorb any shortfall below expectation in the previous period's value of the equity portion of the trust fund. This additional stochastic payroll tax, denoted as a t , equals, at time t, 
where the numerator equals the shortfall in the value of the equity portion of the trust fund while the denominator is the growth-adjusted wage tax base.
The individual born at time t now has assets at age 2 equal to ( ) Despite the popularity of the "shell game" argument among many economists, the second equality in Equation (7) demonstrates that investing the trust fund in equities under the risk allocation considered in this section is not a "shell game." In general, the third and fourth terms of the second equality will not add up to zero, and so the "shell game" scenario is no longer true. Equation (7), however, is only the realized budget constraint, and so one cannot use it to determine the ex-ante value of the risk. First-period agents face an uncertain value of e, and so they face an expected value budget constraint at the beginning of their life. Equation (7) implies a risk-adjusted expected value budget constraint, but not vice versa. Suppose that the policy change occurs at time t -1. The change in the realized budget constraint for a new worker born at time t comes from subtracting Equation (5) from Equation (7). The corresponding change in the expected value budget constraint for a new worker born at time t, measured right before the first period of life, equals Pee + is the price of a one-period put option with a strike price of $1(1 + e) at time t on a dollar's worth of equity that paid a rate of return equal to e t -1 in the previous period. Reducing the above equation to its steady-state form is done purely for illustrative simplification. Although the path of the stock price is nondifferentiable in stochastic steady state, the value of the option is certain as stock price moments are constant.
The first row in Equation (8) gives the risk-adjusted net value of the pay-as-you-go stochastic tax policy to generation t. The first term in this row equals the value of the tax-based guarantee received by generation t from generation t + 1. The second term in this row equals the value of the tax-based guarantee given by generation t to generation t -1. The substitution of Equation (6) along with several mathematical reductions are shown in the following rows in Equation (8). The last row completes the proof that the stochastic tax policy has an equivalent option pricing representation. The guarantee reduces the resources of future generations when the economy is efficient (r > g).
The equality of rows 4 and 5 of Equation (8) assumes complete Arrow-Debreu markets between generations. In particular, the present value of the guarantee benefit to generation t -1 is equal to the present value guarantee cost to generation t; i.e., the government can exploit no intergenerational arbitrage opportunities. This simplifying assumption has several advantages. First, the assumption allows us to derive closed-form analytical solutions that lend themselves to an intuitive interpretation. Second, government agencies can use the equations herein to compute the cost of pay-as-you-go guarantees without the need to set up a general-equilibrium simulation model. Third, guarantees can be priced from arbitrage relationships and, therefore, do not depend on the exact form of the utility function, as do general-equilibrium simulation models. (8) The assumption of complete intergenerational markets is also a plausible benchmark for analyzing trust fund investment in stocks for the U.S. Smetters (2000) considers risk sharing in a neoclassical overlapping generations production economy with incomplete markets between generations.
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His model incorporates fiscal tax policy instruments that already effectively give the government a long position in equities. His simulation results indicate that a greater long position in equities by the government improves intergenerational risk sharing if the correlation between wage and capital income is below about 0.80; a short position (or a smaller effective long position) improves risk sharing at a correlation above 0.80. Interesting, the empirical correlation between wage and capital returns has historically been about 0.80 (although the standard errors are large because the number of unique 30-year periods in the data are limited). The assumption of complete markets, therefore, represents a useful theoretical benchmark, especially as it allows for a closed-form solution.
Returning to Equation (8) 1-1/1 rg  ++  represents the pay-as-you-go nature of the perpetual benefit guarantee, and most analyses of government guarantees omit this expression. The expression can be decomposed as follows: the (1 + r) term recognizes that the option tacitly associated with the stochastic tax policy is being paid for before being potentially exercised instead of being purchased in the previous period. The effective cost of this option is increased by (1 + r) to reflect the implicit borrowing cost. But the total amount needed to be underwritten is smaller by the fraction (1 + g) because of the growth in the tax base.
Note that, unlike most other guarantees, the first moment of the stock price evolution, e , is a relevant parameter in analyzing the cost of the government guarantee. This is because e enters the strike price of the option and the option becomes more e valuable at larger values of e . Equation (8) demonstrates that trust fund investment reduces steady-state resources. To understand this intuitively, one can think conceptually of trust-fund investment under the one-sided bet risk allocation as a two-step process. In the first step, the government invests the trust fund in equities and announces the defined-contribution risk allocation considered in the previous section, in which benefits are adjusted instead of taxes. As shown in the previous section, this first step has no effect on an agent's lifetime resources and no effect on aggregate variables. In the second step, the government announces a switch from the defined-contribution risk allocation to the one-sided bet analyzed in this section. All of the change in economic variables comes solely from this change in the risk allocation. This change in risk allocation gives the initial generation t an instant windfall equal to
YPee bt ⋅+ at the perpetual cost to all future generations. This change in the trust fund's investment strategy is mathematically equivalent to increasing the pay-as-you-go portion of Social Security by the value of a put option that fully insures the equity portion of the trust fund against a performance below its expected value. And just like any expansion of pay-as-you-go financed Social Security benefits, the windfall to the initial generation is paid for in 9 See also Bohn (1999) . perpetuity by all future generations, to their detriment. Furthermore, just like an expansion of pay-as-you-go benefits, national saving will be lower to the extent that trust-fund investment is being used to finance a level of Social Security benefits that are higher than without trust-fund investment. 
ADJUSTING TAXES IN RESPONSE TO A SHOCK: THE TWO-SIDED BET
Under the risk allocation considered in this section, any shortfall in the equity portion of the trust fund below expectation accrues to taxpayers in the form of higher taxes, while any return in excess of expectation passes on to taxpayers in the form of lower taxes. This allocation therefore generates a guaranteed additional amount of revenue to the Social Security Administration equal to 
with the following effect on the expected value budget constraint for a new worker born at time t, where the equation on the second line, to reduce notation, assumes the economy is in a stochastic steady state.
The expression ( ) ( ) 1/11 er ++−  can be interpreted as the shadow risk premium associated with a forward contract that guarantees the trust fund's expected value. The premium is nonnegative in general, and it is zero only if consumers are risk neutral. The level of risk aversion, as reflected in the equity premium, completely determines the ex-ante value of the pay-as-you-go tax policy. The bigger the equity premium, the more valuable the forward contract.
As an interesting policy alternative, consider now a policy in which the trust fund's investment portfolio remains unchanged and, instead, the payroll tax rate on generation t taxpayers explicitly increases. In particular, policymakers increase the payroll tax to generate an additional revenue equal to where the equation assumes the economy to be in a stochastic steady state. This is exactly equal to the change in steady-state resources under the two-sided bet. In other words, investing the trust fund in equities under strict defined-benefit rules is mathematically ex-ante equivalent to an explicit tax increase on only future workers. Indeed, future workers would be better off if payroll taxes were immediately increased to force current workers to help a share of their own future benefits. (Of course, increasing payroll taxes immediately is not the only way to help future workers. The government could also adjust the growth rate of costs.)
Notice that the equivalence of the two-sided bet and the explicit tax increase is completely independent of the functional form assumed for the utility function-including a linear utility function corresponding to risk neutrality. In the case of risk neutrality ( ) re = , the value of forward contract is zero, and so via Equation (10), 0 f ∆= .
But because the trust fund is already obtaining ( ) re = , no additional pay-as-you-go tax revenue is needed to achieve a level of revenue equal in value to investing the trust fund in equities. Hence, via Equation (11), 0 t ∆= . As the values of and e r begin to diverge-i.e., as agents become more risk averse-the value of the risk premium associated with investing the trust fund in equities moves in lock step with the value of the increase in the equal-revenue pay-as-you-go tax rate. Relative Value of the One-Sided Versus Two-Sided Bet As proved below, |||| fp ∆<∆ , i.e., the one-sided bet reduces steady-state resources more than the two-sided bet. It turns out, though, that the two policies have a nearly equivalent effect on steady-state resources for reasonable parameter values. For example, assume a per annum value of e equal to 0.09, which is equal to the long-run historical annual geometric average equity return to the S&P 500. This figure includes both dividend income and corporate income taxes paid, because both would be received by the government. An appropriate choice for r is between 1 2 2 (the post-war geometric average real rate of return obtained by the trust fund) and 1 2 3 (closer to current rates on treasury inflation protected securities). The exact value in this range is numerically unimportant, and the author chooses 3. The historic standard deviation of the first differences of the natural log of the annual S&P 500 total returns from 1949 through 1996 equals 0.16. This is a somewhat conservative estimate, because including returns before 1949 would increase this value even more. Assuming that = and is calculated using the Black and Scholes (1973) pricing formula that computes an exact price for the one-sided bet assuming that the stock price process can be described by an Itô-type stochastic differential equation. In other words, the two-sided bet is worth almost 99 percent of the value of the one-sided bet! To understand this result intuitively, note first that the forward contract shown in Equation (10) can be decomposed into standard put and call options: 
The equivalence of the forward contract and the puts and calls comes directly from the consumer's first-order conditions or, equivalently, from the Hans Stoll (1969) putcall parity relationship.
The put option component of the forward contract shown in Equation (12) represents the guarantee that generation t + 1 will face a higher payroll tax that subsidizes any returns received by generation t below expectation. The call option represents the guarantee that generation t + 1 will receive, in the form of a lower payroll tax, any returns in excess of expectation. Notice that Equation (12) is identical to Equation (8) except for the presence of the call option. Since the call option must always have a positive value, it follows that |||| fp ∆<∆ .
The reason the one-sided and two-sided bets have a similar value is because of the choice of the strike price. The put and call option have an equal value when the strike price equals $1(1 + r). But with a strike price of ( )
$11 e + , the put option becomes substantially more valuable relative to the call. Intuitively, promising risk-averse tax-payers any returns in excess of the expected return is not nearly as valuable in magnitude as promising to tax risk-averse taxpayers to make up any shortfall below expectation. What these calculations imply is that policymakers today need not worry whether future policymakers switch the risk allocation from the two-sided bet to the one-sided bet in light of a graying median voter. The key issue for intergenerational equity is whether future generations are obliged to finance a shortfall-not how returns in excess of expectation are disbursed.
CONCLUSIONS
Most analyses of government guarantees start with an option pricing formulation. This article starts with fiscal policy instruments and derives equivalent option pricing formulae from first principles. In doing so, it accounts for the pay-as-you-go nature of a perpetual guarantee.
The author developed the analysis in the context of a highly relevant example: to invest a portion of the Social Security trust fund in stocks. This proposal is not only interesting in its own right, but also it can be designed as either a one-sided bet, a two-sided bet, or completely neutral. The exact nature of the bet depends on whether taxes or benefits or both are adjusted in response to shocks.
The one-sided and two-sided bets are the most relevant in that these bets correspond to what most advocates of trust fund investment have in mind. Each places a large actuarial burden on future taxpayers and reduces national saving to the extent that trust fund investment is being used to avoid a benefit cut. The two-sided bet is exante equivalent to keeping the trust fund invested in bonds and instead raising the same expected revenue by increasing the payroll tax for sure on only future workers-a result that holds at any value of risk aversion. The one-sided bet harms future workers even more, although only slightly more so.
The relationship between the two-sided bet and the explicit tax increase allows one to express the cost of trust fund investment in terms of an equivalent future payroll tax increase. To compute some numerical values, suppose that a portion of the trust fund is invested in equities and its performance is assessed in 30 years to determine how much one must adjust the payroll tax. It is unlikely that Congress would adjust payroll tax rates much more frequently than this. Looking at long-run trends is also consistent with the wishes of those advocating trust fund investment. As quoted earlier: "there would be ups and downs in returns, but only very long-run trends would matter." Under the two-sided bet, the amount of trust fund investment times the wedge between the expected return to equities and the bond rate (i.e.,
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1, te
Yer tb ⋅−) is committed to finance benefits that are not possible with the current payroll tax rate. Equity returns higher than expected over the 30-year horizon would generate a payroll tax decrease. Equity returns below expectation would require a tax increase.
Suppose initially that 40 percent of the trust fund is invested in equities. The Social Security's Board of Trustees have estimated that investing about 40 percent of the future value of the trust fund in equities (phased in 2000 through 2014) will reduce the Social Security financing deficit by 46 percent. Alternatively, with no change in the trust fund's portfolio, the Trustees calculate that the financing deficit could fully close with an immediate permanent increase in the payroll tax of 2.3 percent (SSAB, 1998) . They also calculate that this 2.3 value nearly doubles if the tax increase is delayed about a generation, or 30 years. The proposal to invest 40 percent of the future value of the trust fund in equities is, therefore, equivalent ex-ante to an increase in the payroll tax in 30 years by 2.1 percent ( ) 0.462.32 ×× -from the current level of 12.4 percent for Old-Age Insurance and Disability to about 14.5 percent. President Clinton's plan to invest around $768 billion in stocks would commit about 14.6 percent of the value of the trust fund to stocks, and it is phased in during the same period as the previous policy experiment (Goss, 1999 
